

## Message Text

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, MNUC, NPG

SUBJECT: NPG-NPG PERMREPS REPORT ON WINTEX-75

REF: USNATO 1897

MISSION PROVIDES BELOW TEXT OF THIRD DRAFT OF NPG PERMREPS REPORT ON WINTEX-75 (NPG(STAFF GROUP) WP(75)4(2ND REVISE)) WHICH IS PREPARED FOLLOWING DISCUSSIONS IN NPG STAFF GROUP ON APRIL 7(REFTEL). THE STAFF GROUP WILL DISCUSS THE DRAFT AT NEXT MEETING ON APRIL 21. ACTION REQUESTED: WASHINGTON COMMENTS PRIOR TO APRIL 21 ON THE DRAFT PERREP REPORT.

BEGIN TEXT

### I. PURPOSE

1. THIS REPORT CONTAINS BEGIN BRACKETS PRELIMINARY END BRACKETS OBSERVATIONS ON SOME NUCLEAR ASPECTS OF WINTEX 75.

### II. BACKGROUND

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2. AT THEIR MEETING IN DECEMBER , 1974 THE NPG MINISTERS ACCEPTED A PROGRAMME FOR FUTURE WORK (1) WHICH SUGGESTED THAT, ON THE BASIS OF LESSONS LEARNED IN WINTEX 73, EXPERIENCE FROM FUTURE NATO EXERCISES WOULD BE USEFUL IN REFINING PROCEDURES

FOR CONSULTATION ON NUCLEAR WEAPON USE AND IN CONFIRMING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A NUMBER OF ACTIONS ALREADY TAKEN IN THIS CONTEXT. IN THE SAME YEIN, THE PROGRAMME ALSO SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE NPG PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES TO PREPARE, IF THEY SO WISHED, A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON WINTEXT 75 FOR THE SPRING 1975 MINISTERIAL MEETING. THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES AGREED THAT SUCH A REPORT SHOULD BE PROVIDED AND HAVE SET FORTH BELOW SOME BEGIN BRACKETS PRELIMINARY END BRACKETS OBSERVATIONS ON THE NUCLEAR CONSULTATION ASPECTS OF WINTEXT 75 TO PROVIDE A POSSIBLE BASIS FOR AN BEGIN BRACKETS INITIAL END BRACKETS EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AMONG THE MINISTERS. IN THIS REGARD, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT FORMAL

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(1) PO/74/140(REVISED), 24TH NOVEMBER, 1974, PARAGRAPH 4(C).  
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REPORTS ON WINTEXT 75 ARE BEING PREPARED BY THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES AND BY THE COUNCIL OPERATIONS AND EXERCISE COMMITTEE WHO HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SCHEDULING, CONDUCTING AND REPORTING ON SUCH EXERCISES. THE COMMENTS BELOW ARE MADE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THESE REPORTS.

### III. WINTEXT 75 FRAMEWORK

#### EXERCISE OUTLINE AND PARTICIPATION

3. WINTEXT 75 WAS A LARGE-SCALE NATO-WIDE COMMAND POST EXERCISE INVOLVING MOST NATO CAPITALS, NATO HEADQUARTERS IN BRUSSELS AND ALL THE MAJOR NATO COMMANDERS, AS WELL AS MANY OF THEIR SUBORDINATE COMMANDS. IT COMPOSED ON ACTIVE PHASE EXTENDING FROM 5 TO 14 MARCH, 1975 PRECEDED BY A PRE-EXERCISE PERIOD WHICH BEGAN ON 24 FEBRUARY 1975. THE DEFENCE PLANNING COMMITTEE AND THE MILITARY COMMITTEE PARTICIPATED DURING THE PERIOD WHICH RAN FROM 10.00 AM (BRUSSELS TIME) ON SUNDAY 9 MARCH TO MIDNIGHT ON MONDAY 10 MARCH, ALTHOUGH POLITICAL AUTHORITIES IN MANY CAPITALS PARTICIPATED THROUGHOUT THE  
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ACTIVE PHASE. THE SCENARIO PORTRAYED A DEEPENING CRISIS LEADING UP TO THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES, A PHASE OF CONVENTIONAL WARFARE CULMINATING IN REQUESTS BY SACLANT AND SACEUR FOR THE RELEASE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR TACTICAL USE. THE FINAL PERIOD OF THE EXERCISE FROM 11 TO 14 MARCH WAS DEVOTED TO TESTING MILITARY PROCEDURES FOR NUCLEAR WARFARE. PRACTISE OF POLITICAL CONSULTATION ON THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WAS CONFINED TO THE PERIOD OF 38 HOURS DURING WHICH THE DPC AND MILITARY COMMITTEE PARTICIPATED AND COVERED REQUESTS BY SACEUR AND SACLANT FOR THE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

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EXERCISE LIMITATIONS.

4. PLAY OF NUCLEAR CONSULTATION IN WINTEX 75 WAS LESS SUBJECT TO ARTIFICIAL CONSTRAINTS THAN ON PREVIOUS EXERCISES OF THIS TYPE-IN CONTRAST TO WINTEX 73 MORE THAN ONE REQUEST FOR INITIAL USE WAS PERMITTED AND THE PERIOD OF DPC AND MILITARY COMMITTEE PARTICIPATION WAS MUCH LONGER. THIS PROVIDED A MORE REALISTIC FRAMEWORK FOR PRACTISE OF NUCLEAR CONSULTATION. NONETHELESS, AS IN ALL EXERCISES, THERE WERE ARTIFICIALITIES WHICH ARE ESSENTIAL TO FACILITATE CONCENTRATION ON EXERCISE OBJECTIVES. EXAMPLES OF SUCH ARTIFICIALITY ARE THE PAUCITY OF BACKGROUND INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO POLITICAL AUTHORITIES COMPARED TO THAT AVAILABLE IN A REAL CRISIS; THE LACK OF A COHERENT BACKGROUND OF DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY, INCLUDING A DIALOGUE WITH THE ENEMY; AND THE DISPARITY OF INFORMATION TOWARDS THE MILITARY COMMITTEE CREATED BY THE DPC MEETING SCHEDULE. WITH REGARD TO THE LATTER IT IS APPRECIATED THAT IN AN ACTUAL SITUATION THE MILITARY COMMITTEE, AS A RESULT OF THE MORE DIRECT AND CONTINUOUS CONTACTS WITH THE MAJOR NATO COMMANDERS, COULD MORE RAPIDLY ACQUIRE DETAILED INFORMATION THAN POLITICAL AUTHORITIES, BUT IT IS ALSO

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APPRECIATED THAT, DUE TO THE CONTINUITY OF THE CONSULTATION IN PERMANENT SESSION, THE DPC WOULD SHARE THAT INFORMATION. CAUTION SHOULD BE EXERSIZEDWHEN DRAWING LESSONS THE BASIS OR JUSTIFICATION OF WHICH RESTS ON ARTIFICIALITIES AS MENTIONED ABOVE.

RESUME OF NUCLEAR CONSULTATION

5. AT THEIR FIRST MEETING AT 1000 ON SUNDAY 9 MARCH THE DPC TOOK NOTE OF AN EARLY NOTIFICATION MESSAGE FROM SACLANC AND APPROVED THE TEXT OF A PRESS STATEMENT FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE. AT THEIR SECOND MEETING AT 1600 ON THE SAME DAY THE DPC CONSIDERED ONE WARNING (WHISKEY) MESSAGE FROM SACLANC CONCERNING THE USE OF UK AND US NUCLEAR DEPTH BOMBS AGAINST SUBMARINES, TWO EARLY NOTIFICATION MESSAGES FROM SACEUR, AND A MESSAGE FROM ONE COUNTRY THEN UNDER HEAVY CHEMICAL ATTACK SUGGESTING A COMMUNICATION TO THE ENEMY THAT THE ONLY ADEQUATE RESPONSE TO SUCH AN ATTACK WAS NUCLEAR.

6. AT 1030 ON MONDAY 10 MARCH, THE DPC MET AGAIN TO CONSULT ON SACLANC'S RELEASE (ROMEO) REQUEST AND THREE WHISKEY MESSAGES FROM SACEUR. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE CONVEYED THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY THE MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES TO THE MILITARY COMMITTEE ON THE WARNING MESSAGES AND THE RELEASE REQUESTS. THE DEFENCE PLANNING COMMITTEE HEARD THE VIEWS OF ITS MEMBERS ON SACLANC'S ROMEO AND SACEUR'S THREE WHISKEY MESSAGE; THEIR VIEWS ON THE SACLANC ROMEO WERE TRANSMITTED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO THE TWO NUCLEAR POWERS.

7. THE DPC MET FOR THE LAST TIME AT 1600 THAT AFTERNOON TO CONSIDER THREE ROMEO REQUESTS FROM SACEUR, AND THE NATIONAL VIEWS EXPRESSED WERE AGAIN TRANSMITTED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO THE NUCLEAR POWERS. THE DPC NOTED THE STATEMENTS OF THE UK AND US REPRESENTATIVES THAT THEIR GOVERNMENTS HAD APPROVED SACLANC'S RELEASE REQUEST.

IV. DISCUSSION  
OBSERVATIONS ON INITIAL USE

8. THE PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES STATE (1) THAT  
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THE FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE OF INITIAL USE, AS OF ANY MILITARY ACT, WILL ALWAYS BE POLITICAL, SINCE IT IS, AS ANY TACTICAL USE, AIMED AT INDUCING THE ENEMY TO CEASE HIS ATTACK AND WITHDRAW. IT IS ALSO NOTED THAT INITIAL USE WOULD IMPLICITLY CONTAIN A MESSAGE OF WARNING TO THE ENEMY (2). IT WOULD APPEAR, THEREFORE, THAT SUCH USE SHOULD HAVE CERTAIN CHARACTERISTICS TO SATISFY THE POLITICAL REQUIREMENT. IN THIS CONTEXT IT IS NOTED THAT THE FOUR ROMEO MESSAGES (ONE FROM SACLANC; THREE

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(1) PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES FOR THE INITIAL DEFENSIVE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY NATO, DPC/D(69)58 (REVISED), 10TH DECEMBER, 1970 (HEREAFTER REFERRED TO AS PPG);  
(2) PPG, PARAGRAPH 39; NPG STUDY 46, 20 TH SEPTEMBER, 1974  
PARAGRAPHS 5 AND 17.  
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FROM SACEUR) WERE VERY DIFFERENT WITH REGARD TO TIMING, NATURE AND SCALE OF INITIAL USE AS DESCRIBED IN THE PPG. THESE MESSAGES CONCERNED MARITIME USE IN THE ATLANTIC/NORTH SEA, BATTLEFIELD USE IN THE NORTHERN CENTRAL REGION, ADM USE IN THE SOUTHERN CENTRAL REGION ANTI-AIR USE IN THE NORTHERN PART OF THE SOUTHERN REGION. OF THESE, ONE (BATTLE-FILED USE) ALLOWED NATO A SIGNIFICANT DEGREE OF CONTROL WITH REGARD TO TIMING (1) THE EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR INITIAL USE AGAINST ENEMY FORCES. IT IS OUR VIEW THAT CONTROL OF TIME MIGHT IMPACT THE CONSULTATION AND DECISION-MAKING PROCESS WITH REGARD TO FURTHER USE, IF SUCH USE WERE NECESSARY. CONSIDERATION OF THIS KIND MIGHT BE MOST CRITICAL IN A RAPIDLY ENVOLVING SITUATION WHEN A WELL-TIMED AND CLEAR POLITICAL SIGNAL TO THE ENEMY WOULD BE NECESSARY. IT FOLLOWS FROM THESE OBSERVATIONS THAT THE SELECTION OF THE PARTICULAR INITIAL USE OPTION WOULD REQUIRE CAREFUL POLITICAL ANALYSIS IN THE LIGHT OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

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(1) PPG, PARAGAPH 32(B)  
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9. APART FROM THESE DIFFICULTIES OF MEETING THE POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR INITIAL USE, THERE COULD BE ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS FOR NATO. IF NATO HAD DECIDED TO SEND A WARNING/EXPLANATORY MESSAGE TO THE ENEMY ITS TIMING MIGHT NEED TO BE RELATED TO THAT OF THE UE ITSELF AND THERE MIGHT WELL BE DIFFICULTY IN ENSURING THIS. FURTHER, FOLLOW-ON USE CANNOT TAKE PLACE UNTIL AFTER INITIAL USE, AND IT MAY BE

DESIRABLE THAT THERE SHOULD BE A PAUSE BETWEEN THE TWO TO ALLOW TIME TO ASSESS THE ENEMY REACTION TO THE FORMER. IF THE EXECUTION TIME OF PREVIOUSLY APPROVED INITIAL USE WERE UNCERTAIN, CONSULTATION ON FOLLOW-ON USE MIGHT HAVE TO BEGIN WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF SUCH BASIC DATA AS TIMING OF INITIAL USE, MILITARY EFFECTS AND ENEMY REACTION. INDEED, IF THE INITIAL USE WERE UNACCEPTABLY DELAYED, NATO MIGHT HAVE TO THINK AGAIN AND CHOOSE A DIFFERENT INITIAL USE OPTION. ALTHOUGH WE RECOGNIZE THAT MEANS EXIST FOR HOLDING, BY POLITICAL OR MILITARY AUTHORITIES, NUCLEAR RELEASE AUTHORITY ALREADY GRANTED BY THE NUCLEAR POWER, IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS PROCEDURE, GIVEN THE INEVITABLE COMMUNICATIONS TIME-LAG, WOULD BE BOUND TO CAUSE FURTHER DELAYS IN SUBSEQUENT CONSULTATION.

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10. IN TERMS OF TYPES OF REQUESTS FROM MNCS, IT IS OBSERVED THAT IN MANY CASES OF ASW AND AD, SUCH REQUESTS MIGHT TAKE THE FORM OF SSIERRA MESSAGES, THAT IS A REQUEST FOR PRE-CONDITIONED RELEASE. IN OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES OF ASW AND AD, THE SAME PURPOSE MAY BE REACHED BY USING ROMEO MESSAGE, BUT REQUESTING RELEASE OF WEAPONS TO BE USED ONLY IF AND WHEN CERTAIN SPECIFIED OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS ARE MET. THE PURPOSE OF SUCH MESSAGES IS THAT OF MEETING THE NEEDS STEMMING FROM THE CLOSE INTERCONNECTION BETWEEN TIMELY RELEASE AND MILITARY UTILITY IN SITUATIONS REQUIRING AN ALMOST INSTANTANEOUS REACTION OR INVOLVING FLEETING TARGETS. WITHOUT REPEATING THE COMMENTS ON THE RESPECTIVE MERIT OF THESE MESSAGES IN AN ACTUAL MILITARY SITUATION, ALREADY INCLUDED IN A PREVIOUS NPG REPORT (1) IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT ON THE BASIS OF THE REMARKS IN THE PREVIOUS PARAGRAPHS, FROM A POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW SIERRA MESSAGES AND SOME ROMEO MESSAGES IN CERTAIN CASES MIGHT NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS FOR INITIAL USE.

11. COUNTRY REQUEST. DURING THE EXERCISE ONE COUNTRY WAS

SUBMITTED TO A MASSIVE CHEMICAL ATTACK WHICH IT REGARDED TO BE AS DEVASTATING AND ESCALATORY AS A LOCAL NUCLEAR ATTACK. IT CONSEQUENTLY INFORMED THE NATO COUNCIL/DPC THAT IT CONSIDERED THE ONLY APPROPRIATE RESPONSE TO BE A NUCLEAR ATTACK WITH SIMILAR EFFECT ON WARSAW PACT TERRITORY, AND IT URGED THE NATO COUNCIL/DPC IMMEDIATELY TO COMMUNICATE THIS CONSIDERATION TO THE WARSAW PACT. IT FURTHER REQUESTED THAT A SIMILAR CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE COMMUNICATED TO THE UNITED NATIONS' SECURITY COUNCIL. THE POSSIBILITY OF RESPONDING WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS WAS THEREFORE DISCUSSED IN THE DPC. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES DEMONSTRATIVE USE (2) WAS ONE OF THE OPTIONS OPEN TO NATO (3). HOWEVER, SINCE ANY OF THE OTHER OPTIONS

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(1) NPG/D(75)1, 17TH APRIL 1973, PARAGRAPHS 7 AND 8

(2) PPG, PARAGRAPHS 46-50

(3) PPG, PARAGRAPH 66

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(ADM, AIR DEFENCE, BATTLEFILED, EXTENDED GEOGRAPHICAL AREA,  
MARITIME) WOULD ALSO BE DEMONSTRATIVE OF NATO'S WILLINGNESS  
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TO ENGAGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE CONFLICT(1), IT WAS AGREED  
THAT THE PURPOSE IN THE COUNTRY MESSAGE OF SENDING TO THE  
ENEMY A "POLITICAL SIGNAL" WOULD HAVE BEEN MET, IF ONE  
(OR MORE) OF THE MNCS'(RELEASE REQUESTS WAS (WERE) APPROVED.  
(PARAGRAPH 8 ABOVE WOULD BE PERTINENT IN THIS RESPCT).  
THE DEMONSTRATIVE USE OPTION AS AN APPROPRIATE COURSE OF  
ACTION OPEN TO NATO FOR INITIAL USE IN THIS PARTICULAR  
SITUATION WAS OVERRULED.

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12. THE COUNTRY ACTION MENTIONED ABOVE WAS IN LINE  
WITH THE PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES (2), GENERAL GUIDE-  
LINES FOR CONSULTATION PROCEDURES (3), AND WITH AN EARLIER  
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES' REPORT(4) MENTIONING THE POSSIBILITY  
FOR REQUESTS TO BE GENERATED BY GOVERNMENTS. SINCE THESE  
REQUESTS MAY DIFFER, IN FORMAT AND CONTENT, FROM THOSE  
SUBMITTED BY THE NATO MAJOR COMMANDERS BUT HAVE TO BE  
IMPLEMENTED BY THEM, IMMEDIATE MILITARY ADVICE WOULD BE  
NEEDED FOR POLITICAL CONSULTATION. EXPERIENCE FROM WINTEX75  
DEMONSTRATES THAT EXISTING PROCEDURES FOR CONSULTATION ON  
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- (1) PPG, PARA GRAPH 45
- (2) PPG, PARAGRAPH 21, 22
- (3) DPC/D(69)59, 20TH NOVEMBER, 1969, PARAGRAPH III, 3(A)
- (4) NPG/D(72)2, 17TH APRIL 1962, PARAGRAPH 38

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POSSIBLE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE RESPONSIVE TO THIS  
OBJECTIVE.

13. COMMUNICATING NATO'S INTENTIONS. DURING WINTEX 75,  
THE POSSIBILITIES FOR COMMUNICATING NATO'S INTENTIONS (CNI)  
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WAS AN IMPORTANT FOCUS OF ATTENTION, AND THE DPC DISCUSSION  
ILLUSTRATED THE POSSIBILITY THAT NATO MEMBER GOVERNMENTS MIGHT  
WISH TO WARN THE WARSAW PACT OF THE NECESSITY OF NATO NUCLEAR  
USE IN THE FACE OF CONTINUED AGGRESSION. A CLEAR EXAMPLE OF  
THIS WAS THE REQUEST IN THE COUNTRY MESSAGE MENTIONED IN  
PARAGRAPH 11 ABOVE. SUCH A WARNING WOULD BE DESIGNED TO  
INDUCE THE ENEMY TO WITHDRAW BEFORE THE ALLIANCE MUST RESORT  
TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE WINTEX 75 EXPERIENCE REINFORCES THE  
SUGGESTION IN THE NCI STUDY (1) THAT THERE SHOULD BE FURTHER  
EXAMINATION OF THE POSSIBILITIES FOR WARNING MESSAGES AS  
OPPOSED TO MESSAGES SIMPLY EXPLAINING AN ALREADY INEVITABLE  
RESORT TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY THE ALLIANCE.

14. AS A GENERAL COMMENT, DPC DISCUSSIONS DURING  
WINTEX 75 POINTED OUT THAT THERE WAS A COMMON UNDERSTANDING ON  
THE IMPORTANCE OF CNI ACTIONS AND ON THE NECESSITY OF STARTING  
RELATED CONSULTATIONS PRIOR TO RECEIPT OF ROMEO MESSAGES.  
THIS CONSULTATION COULD BE FACILITATED IF WHISKEY MESSAGES  
CONTAINED THE INFORMATION NEEDED FOR THIS PURPOSE.

- (1) NPG/D(74)10, PARAGRAPH 14  
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#### CONCLUDING REMARKS

15. IN GENERAL, WINTEX 75 CONFIRMED THAT THOSE PORTIONS  
OF EXISTING PROCEDURES FOR CONSULTATION ON POSSIBLE USE OF  
NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH WERE IMPLEMENTED DURING THE EXERCISE  
AS REFINED AFTER EXPERIENCE GAINED FROM WINTEX 73 ARE  
RESPONSIVE TO CRISIS MANAGEMENT NECESSITIES IN CASE OF  
HOSTILITIES. THIS APPLIES ALSO TO THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE  
MILITARY COMMITTEE (1).

16. THE USE OF "EARLY NOTIFICATION MESSAGES" BY MAJOR  
NATO COMMANDERS CONFIRMED THE EXTREMELY USEFUL CONTRIBUTION  
OF THESE MESSAGES TOWARD MEETING THE NEED TO PROVIDE  
POLITICAL AUTHORITIES WITH TIMELY INFORMATION RELATED TO  
POSSIBLE INCOMING REQUESTS FOR THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

#### V. RECOMMENDATIONS



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17. THE MINISTERS MAY WISH TO:

(A) TAKE NOTE OF THIS REPORT;

(B) DISCUSS THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE OBSERVATIONS  
MADE THEREIN; AND

(C) INDICATED, IN THE LIGHT OF THEIR DECISION,

THE PARTICULAR POINTS ON WHICH FURTHER STUDY

OR ACTION SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN.

(1) DPC/D(74)17, 24TH JULY, 1974

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